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Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to draw a preliminary model of
an ontology of organizations. The emphasis is on the structural aspects
of organizations and the relations that these have with the design process
of the organization itself on the one hand, and with its normative layer
on the other.
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1 Introduction
This paper tries to lay the basis for an abstract model that integrates and accom-
modates different features of organizations which are only separately considered
in the literature. In particular, we focus on a specific kind of organizations,
namely social entities that are designed to obtain certain objectives coordinating
some collective behavior by means of norms. The FIAT company or Al Quaeda
are examples of the kind of organizations we intend to capture. For the time
being, we don’t consider ‘emergent’ organizations or self-organized groups (e.g.
a group of friends meeting every Thursday at Mollie’s pub) even though, prob-
ably, most of the aspects considered in our model are also relevant for this kind
of organizations.
In our model, an organization is intended as:
• multi-layered : structured in irreducible layers (not reducible to basic roles
and their interrelations);
• designed : created by means of a decisional process and with specific objec-
tives in mind;
• agentive: coordinating agents in order to obtain its objectives;
• realized : ultimately built by autonomous agents playing specific roles;
• situated : immersed in the environment;
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• dynamic: its structure and its realization may change through time;
• regulated : governed and structured by norms.
In this paper we focus on how the structure and the design of organizations
are linked to the normative dimension. For this goal, other features need to be
considered, but here we don’t describe them in detail.
2 Organizations as Multilayered Entities
In literature, it is common to consider organizations as structured entities. So-
ciology [1], philosophy [2,3,4] and computer science[5,6,7,8] generally agree that
organizations are (at least) complex sets of roles tied together. For example,
the organization model of OperA [7] consists of a social structure, i.e. roles and
groups of roles, and an interaction structure, which contains the interaction re-
lations between the elements of the social structure. Similarly, in [9, p. 146] we
read that “an organization is structured through a set of roles, to which are as-
sociated deontic notions (...), that apply to the agents that are the actual holder
of such roles, when playing those roles”. However, their structures are, in some
sense, flat. This does not mean that these authors disregard the fact that roles
can be arranged in a hierarchy (this is often the case in their models, e.g. in
OperA [7] roles are hierarchically arranged by dependencies or power relations
holding among them), but, at the end, organizations can be reduced to sets of
interrelated roles. This is clearly true also in [10] where a function which defines
the goals of the MultiAgent System as a whole starting from the goals of its
agentive constituents is introduced.
Even though in our model roles are still the basic units of organizations,
sub-organizations (i.e. organizations that are at an abstraction level which is in
the middle between the one of the whole organization and the one of roles) play
a fundamental role in the specification of organizations. In particular, in the
model teleological considerations drive the structuring of organizations. Roles
and sub-organizations are created and designed with the precise aim of accom-
plishing certain objectives whose achievement brings about the achievement of
the overall objectives of the organization1. But, in real cases, the chosen struc-
ture and the chosen reallocation of objectives to sub-organizations do not offer
a complete description of the whole organization. The goals of the whole orga-
nization represent the common goals of the sub-organizations and they cannot
be reduced to a composition of the particular goals of the sub-organizations.
This means that the whole organization is something more than its parts. In
this sense, organizations are not only structured but also multi-layered entities
and roles can be seen just as unstructured organizations.2
1 These intuitions are already present in classical works as [11], more recently in [12]
and [13].
2 The presence of these overall objectives (pre-established and not emergent) could
represent a motivation for distinguishing organizations from simple groups of roles.
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The literature does not consider the latter features in an integrated fashion. In
[6] the authors propose an organization ontology for the TOVE enterprise model
in which organizations are seen as composite entities whose parts are divisions
and subdivisions; on the other hand, the teleological aspects are explained with
reference to goals of the organization and subgoals which are assigned directly to
roles, but roles are not linked to sub-divisions, thus leaving the teleological and
the structural dimensions independent . Similarly, in Enterprise Ontology (EO)
[14] an organization – called organization unit – can be decomposed into smaller
organizations (persons can be seen as organization units), so that an organization
structure is built by means of management links3 between organization units,
but the decomposition of goals – called in EO ‘purposes’ – is not taken into
account.
Furthermore, we also represent the context, the environment, in which the
organization is situated. Already in [15] it is stressed that what they call the “con-
ceptualized environment” must be part of the organizational model. In addition,
some works in sociology, as [16,17], observe that the behavior of an organization
is not only determined by its internal structure, but also by the way in which it
is linked to other organizations that are not under its (complete) control.
As roles and sub-organizations can be linked together by relations like de-
pendence, trust, delegation, etc., in our model we allow also the same kinds of
relations with external organizations. These external links represent the environ-
ment. The arguments of these relations can be organizations, objectives, states
of affairs, actions, etc. As an example, an organization o1 could delegate just a
specific objective to o2, or o1 could trust o2 for performing specific (kinds of)
actions, etc.
3 Organizations as Designed Entities
Organizations can also be seen as artifacts whose function is to coordinate some
collective behavior. If we take an artifact, for instance a chair, we can see that
each part of the chair contributes to the main function of the chair, that is
something to sit on. In the same way, we can imagine that every part of the
organization has a function that contributes to the general goal of the organi-
zation. For the time being we take this only as a metaphor, leaving aside some
more detailed ontological questions on artifacts, namely whether organizations
are really artifacts and to what extent they are different from material artifacts
as chairs and hammers4.
In this section we focus only on the design process: a designer starts by fig-
uring out an organization with some general objectives and successively refines
that organization by introducing new sub-organizations (with new objectives)
linked in a specific (and maybe normative) way. In order to model design, [15]
3 “To manage” here means “to assign purpose to”.
4 It is also possible to draw a parallel with the algebraic specification and program
development, see for example [18], [19].
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introduces a notion of refinement and characterizes it as a process of specifica-
tion of the description of an organization. Organizations that (unstructured) are
roles at a specific level of refinement can be structured and detailed at a lower
level of refinement. In this sense, the design and the structure of an organization
are linked, i.e. the designer expresses a specific way of ‘implementing’ the ob-
jectives of the whole organization by imposing a structure on it. He establishes
how the objectives declared for the whole organization can be ‘decomposed’
into simpler objectives attributed to simpler sub-organizations and how these
sub-organizations are linked by means of institutional relations. In general, this
can be a much more complex relation than the standard and/or decomposition
considered in most of the existing approaches. But a more precise link can be
established between the refinement and the layers of organizations. Each refine-
ment step can be seen as a change of layer in the organization structure, i.e.
at each refinement step we are trying to implement the organization by intro-
ducing a new set of roles linked in a specific way, and we want to maintain this
information in the resulting organization. This is done by decoupling the goals
of the starting organization from the goals of the sub-organizations introduced
in the refinement. In this sense the refinement can be seen as a link between
two flat organizations. Clearly the designer wants to implement organizations in
a correct way, i.e. he wants the refined organization to be able to achieve the
goals declared for the initial one. The irreducibility of the goals of the whole
organization to a composition of the goals of its sub-organizations offers all the
necessary information to check the ‘correctness’ of the implementation, once we
have a sort of composition function of goals.
Let us consider a simple example. The design process can be seen as a se-
quence of refinement steps: o o′ stands for “o′ is the refinement of o”. If o is
already structured (even though flat), we write o o1 o′, in order to indicate that
this refinement is relative only to the o1 component of the structured organiza-
tion o.
Table 1 illustrates two different design processes of the organization o. At
t1, the first step of the design (a.) introduces two sub-organizations (o1 and r3)
that are not linked, i.e. o is refined in o1, a flat organization exactly structured
in o1 and r3. At t2, the second step of the design (a.) refines only one com-
ponent of o1, namely o1, introducing two non linked sub-organizations (r2 and
r3). The multilayered organization that is obtained via this design process is
depicted in figure 1.a. Similarly, the design process in table 1.b originates the
multilayered organization in figure 1.b. If we reduce organizations to roles (un-
structured organizations), then the two organizations in figure 1 are identical,
but by considering them as multilayered we can also encapsulate the refinement
in the structure. This is especially important in the case of organizations that
are created by different designers by means of specific laws.
So far we considered only the refinement of goals. Other kinds of refinements
can also be introduced: refinement of norms, refinement of the environment, etc.
In addition, it is possible to consider other design operators like, for example,
‘generalizing’, ‘deleting’, etc. In particular, here as in [15] the process of speci-
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fication of an organization is strictly top-down. But we can also consider some
bottom-up operators, as for example the ‘grouping’ operator in [20], i.e. two or
more organizations can be grouped together to achieve some common goals. We
recognize the existence and importance of both processes: in fact a designer may
decompose the overall objective of an organization into sub-objectives that he
assigns to sub-organizations or roles that are purportedly created to accomplish
those objectives. Otherwise, agents that have compatible, complementary or co-
inciding objectives can decide to share their objectives and join in a plural entity.
In our model this difference is encoded only in the design representation, the ob-
tained organization does not depend on the direction of the design. For example,
table 2 illustrates the bottom-up design of the same organizations depicted in the
figure 15. Our multilayered model is then compatible with both kinds of design
and therefore with the two approaches in the theory of organization singled out
by [21]: organizations from aggregations of agents vs. organizations as designed
entities that influence the behavior of agents.
Time Org.Intr. Refin. Time Org.Intr. Refin.
t0 o t0 o
t1 {o1, r3} o o o1 t1 {r1, o2} o o o2
t2 {r1, r2} o1 o1 o3 t2 {r2, r3} o2 o2 o4
a. b.



















Fig. 1. Different organizations resulting from the design processes in table 1.
5 The grouping operator is represented by .
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Time Org.Intr. Group. Time Org.Intr. Group.
t0 {r1, r2} t0 {r2, r3}
t1 o1 r1, r2 o1 t1 o2 r2, r3 o2
t2 {o, r3} o1, r3 o t2 {o, r1} o2, r1 o
a. b.
Table 2. Different grouping processes.
4 Organizations and Norms
In some accounts, as shown in [4], organizations are intended as completely made
up of norms. For the moment we don’t commit to such a strong position, but in
any case undoubtedly norms are central in organizations and there are several
ways in which the normative layer affects the organization and the behavior of
its members. Here we just sketch some preliminary analyses of the following
relevant topics.
Norms and design. Often the entire design of an organization is described by
norms, as for example in many legal organizations. This kind of norms can be
called, following Searle’s terminology [22,23], “constitutive”. Constitutive norms
(or rules, as he calls them) are norms that, as pointed out in [24] and in [25],
create new objects [25]:
they have a defining function: they create new concepts, roles, so-
cial individuals; they can also establish which are the requirements that
an entity should meet in order to be classified under a certain role or
concept.
They can even create new organizations as, for example, the Republic of Italy
and its Constitution6.
Norms and the structure of organizations. By means of norms the objectives of
the organizations are linked to their roles. The relations among these objectives
and the roles can be permissions or obligations: as an example, a president is
allowed to enter in some area but it is mandatory for the president not to interfere
with the job of the technicians in that area. They can be understood as what
Searle [22,23] calls “regulative rules” and Hart calls “primary rules” [30]. This
kind of rules regulate antecedently existing forms of behavior. For instance, a
rule like “drive on the right hand side of the road” regulates the driving without
defining it: the driving exists before the rule that imposes duties to individuals
by the way of the role that these individuals play.
6 Formal frameworks for constitutive rules have been proposed, for instance in [26],
[27], [28] and [29].
Designing Organizations 7
Norms and contracts. Agents’ behavior is not only forced by regulative or pri-
mary norms. In what we can call ‘realizations’ of organizations, agents are often
linked to the organizations via agreements or contracts. A realization is then a
particular instance of a designed organization in which all the roles are assigned
to specific agents. For instance, all the persons that actually have a (direct or in-
direct) employment contract with FIAT are its actual realization. In this sense,
a contract can be conceived of as the bridge between the descriptive level of
designed organizations and the concrete level of agents, i.e. a sort of norm that
links abstract roles with specific individual agents. When an agent, say Paolo
Rossi, is hired by a company, say FIAT, he acquires new rights and obligations
that are partially specified in the contract he signs.
Norms and inter-organizational relations. As we stated in section 2, organiza-
tions are situated in an environment of other organizations that can be internal
or external with respect to it. When two organizations are linked, this often
affects the normative dimension. This kind of relations are considered in [25]
and in [8]. In [25] an example of a specific iterorganizational normative rela-
tion is given, namely the relation that holds between the Italian State and the
University of Torino [25]:
We could say that the University of Torino is in a way “nested”
into the Italian State. The normativity of the relation relies on the fact
that the descriptive system of the “contained” organization is, in some
sense, more specialized with respect to the descriptive system of the
“containing” one: all the norms that are valid in the Italian State must
also be valid in the University of Torino.
There are other kinds of norms and normative relations in the institutional
setting, for example we can consider again contracts and agreements that make
alliances possible, as in the case of military alliances among countries, like in the
NATO organization.
Metanorms and organizational change. An important notion for understanding
the complex relationships among organizations and norms is that of metanorm
or what Hart calls “secondary rule”. Secondary rules are, according to Hart [31],
rules about rules. This kind of norms state – for example – how to resolve con-
troversies in conflicting norms. At a certain time, after some steps of refinement,
the designer may decide which is the structure that the organization will have.
But organizations in a changing environment must be flexible. Nonetheless, not
all the changes should be admissible. In this case it is possible to introduce some
meta-norms that regulate the evolution of an organization by describing its ac-
ceptable changes. In addition to that, the designer itself can be subject to some
norms that constraint the design itself.
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